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Utah corporation, LINDA D. 
MILNE, and WESTERN SURETY 
COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS IN REPLY TO BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
LINDA D. MILNE AND WESTERN SURETY COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants adopt the Statement of the Case section 
of their opening brief supplemented as follows: 
Appellees1 (Milne and Western Surety Company) 
motion for summary judgment is based upon their assertion 
that "[t]he undisputed facts establish as a matter of law 
that no action or conduct of defendant Milne caused the 
plaintiffs the injuries that they allegedly suffered." 
(R. 573). The basis for appellees1 conclusion, as stated 
in their memorandum of points and authorities, is that 
[pllaintiffs1 only claim against defendant 
Milne is that she notarized the trust deed 
without observing their signing of the 
documents, and that this notarization 
caused them to lose their property. The 
No. 900411-CA 
(Category 16) 
undisputed facts however establish as a 
matter of law that defendant Milne's 
conduct did not cause plaintiffs to 
lose their property, since Overland 
had the right or power to foreclosure 
regardless of whether the trust deed 
was notarized. 
A notarization is not required to make 
a trust deed on real property enforce-
able. See Utah Code 57-1-6. The reason 
that real estate contracts are notarized 
is to permit them to be recorded. See 
Utah Code 7-3-1 et seq. Recording is 
not required to make real estate con-
tracts enforceable between the parties 
but only to permit recording thereby 
protecting the beneficiary of the con-
tract from subsequent purchasers. (Cit-
ations omitted) Thus notarization or 
recording of the documents is not a 
condition precedent to enforcement. 
Whatever the theory of plaintiffs' 
claims against defendant Milne, 
plaintiffs cannot recover from defendant 
Milne unless they can prove that Milne's 
notarization of the trust deed caused 
the plaintiff's to lose their property 
through foreclosure. (emphasis added) 
This, they cannot prove. Milne's notar-
ization did not give Overland the right 
or power to foreclose and therefore did 
not cause the plaintiffs to lose their 
property. 
On default. Overland, pursuant to trust 
deed, had the right to foreclose on the 
plaintiffs' property whether or not the 
trust deed was notarized or recorded. 
The notary did not give Overland any 
right that it did not have from the 
documents themselves absent the notary. 
Milne's conduct in placing the notari-
zation on these documents did not cause 
plaintiffs to lose their property since 
even without the notary Overland would 




In Novemberf 1984, defendant Milne was employed 
by PFC. (R. 61) 
PFC is Overland1s assignor. (R. 108) 
Plaintiff Dale L. Larson did not sign the trust 
deed. (R. 14, 118) 
On November 20, 1984, plaintiff Grethe Larson 
signed her own name and plaintiff Dale L. Larson's name 
to the trust deed. (fl 12, R. 580) Neither Dale nor 
Grethe ever acknowledged execution of the trust deed 
before defendant Milne. (R. 225) 
Defendant Milne, a notary public, acknowledged the 
trust deed as follows, 
(Notary STATE OF UTAH ) 
Seal) )ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
On this 20th day of November, 1984 
personally appeared before me DALE 
L. LARSON AND GRETHE LARSON the 
signer(s) of the above instrument 
who duly acknowledged to [] that 
they executed the same. 
My Commission expires: 
April 6, 1987 /s/Linda D. Milne 
Notary Public 
(R. 103) Residing at;Sandy, Utah 
Early on in these proceedings (May, 1987) Milne's 
sworn statement or affidavit, of and concerning the 
trust deed and the circumstances of its purported 
execution, contained the following allegations, 
5. In the course of negotiating the 
proposed lease, Overland indicated 
that it would not purchase the 
-3-
proposed lease unless additional 
security for the transaction was 
available. 
6. In response to Overland1s re-
quirement/ Larson agreed to put 
a second trust deed on his home 
in favor of Overland which would 
be collateral security for the 
payment of the lease. 
7. After all the lease documents 
had been prepared/ I took the 
lease. Trust Deed and other 
documents to the Larsons1 home 
for signature. All of the docu-
ments/ including the Trust Deed/ 
were signed by Larson and his 
wifef Grethel [sic] Larson 
(hereinafter "Mrs. Larson")/ in 
my presence. I then notarized 
the documents requiring a notary, 
and caused the documents to be 
delivered to Overland. 
8. PFC was subsequently informed 
that Overland had Learned a 
second trust deed existed on the 
Larson home and would need to 
be removed before finalizing the 
Lease and that new documents 
would need to be signed because 
of this. 
9. When new documents were pre-
pared/ I again went to the 
Larsons' home, this time with 
Ray Welling (hereinafter 
"Welling")/ another employee of 
PFC. At the Larsons1 home/ 
Welling and I met with Mrs. 
Larson in the kitchen. 
10. Welling and I explained the 
provisions of the documents to 
Mrs. Larson and answered her 
questions. At no time, howeverf 
did Welling or I promise or 
represent to Mrs. Larson that 
the Trust Deed would be releas-
ed before the lease had been 
paid in full. 
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11. Mrs. Larson then signed the 
Trust Deed in my presence. 
12. Mrs. Larson then informed me 
that Larson was in a shop build-
ing located behind their home. 
13. Mrs. Larson then went to the 
shop building in order to obtain 
the signature of Larson on the 
documents. Soon thereafter, I 
followed Mrs. Larson to the 
shop. We found Larson in the 
shop building where he exhibited 
to me the equipment which was 
the subject of the lease, which 
was then in operation. 
14. I commented to Larson that 
he must have a lot of faith in 
his son-in-law to put his home 
on the line for the business 
venture. Larson indicated that 
he did and was very supportive 
of Lucking and the new business 
venture which would be engaged 
in by the use of the leased 
equipment, and stated several 
times his enthusiasm and 
confidence for both Lucking and 
the new business venture. 
15. As I entered the shop, 
Larson was signing the necessary 
documents. When Larson signed 
the lease documents, he placed 
the documents on top of or at 
the side of the machine and 
signed them while standing over 
or next to the machine. The 
machine was operating while 
Larson signed the documents and 
I observed that the machine 
vibrated whle in operation. 
Larson then handed the documents 
to me. 
16. Mrs. Larson and I then 
returned to the home and Welling 
and I departed. 
(R. 62-65) 
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If the facts and inferrences are analyzed in 
the light most favorably to plaintiffs, in the matter 
of obtaining the proper execution of the trust deed by 
Larsons, PFC, through its employees Welling and Milne, 
was Overland's agent. 
In their fincil complaint, plaintiffs allege, 
On or about November 20, 1984 
while acting as such notary 
public, and as agent for said 
P.F.C. and defendant Overland, 
defendant Milne, with a purpose 
to cheat and defraud plaintiffs 
Larson of their said real prop-
erty, notarized said trust deeds 
which were then entitled to be 
and were recorded in the Salt 
Lake County recorder's office. 
In their fincil complaint, plaintiffs include 
their claim for fees incurred in litigation against 
defendant Overland to undo the problems caused by Milne's 
false and fraudulent notarization and subsequent record-
ation of the trust deed in clouding plaintiffs' title, 
and for damages for plaintiffs' mental anguish resulting 
therefrom. (R. 398-99) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In their motion for summary judgment appellees 
Milne and Western Surety Company, 
1) failed to demonstrate that there is no 
genuine issues as to any material fact, and 
2) failed to make a showing which precludes 




1) Appellees1 summary judgment motion is pre-
mised on their erroneous supposition that plaintiffs1 
claim against Milne rests soly on, in appellees1 
words (ante., page 2), [plaintiffs1 ability to] "prove 
that Milne's notarization caused the plaintiff's [sic] 
to lose their property through foreclosure." (R. 582) 
As a matter of fact, plaintiffs' claim has never been 
that they lost their property at all. Their claim is 
that the trustee's sale is invalid because the under-
lying trust deed 1) was obtained by fraud, 2) was not 
executed by Dale, and 3) nothing is due under the trust 
deed because the equipment lease it secures is in fact 
a security agreement and there was no commercially 
reasonable disposition after repossession so that a 
deficiency is barred, and the liquidated damages pro-
vision in the lease is unenforceable as a penalty or 
forfeiture. There is no independent basis apart from 
the lease to establish an obligation under the trust deed. 
A notary who knowingly purports to authenticate 
a document which, in fact has not been properly 
authenticated, to the detrimental reliance of innocent 
third parties, is liable for fraud. 58 AmJur2d Notaries 
Public § 64, p. 559. 
Milne knew that by acknowledging the trust deed 
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she was telling the world that plaintiffs had appeared 
before her and affixed their signatures in her presence, 
and she thus committed fraud in that she purportedly 
let third parties rely on the trust deed she notarized. 
Summers Bros., Inc. v. Brewer, 420 So.2d 197 (La.App. 
1982); 44 ALR 3rd 1243 
The existence of fraud is a question of fact 
for the fact finder. Chamberlain Livestock Auction v. 
Penner, 462 N.W.2d 479 (S.D. 1990). 
In Vikers v. Shepard, 526 So.2d 1016 (Fla.App. 
1988)f the Floria appellate court reiterated that 
...fraud is not ordinarily a suitable 
subject for summary judgment. (Citation 
omitted) It is a subtle thing requir-
ing a full explanation of the facts and 
circumstances of the alleged wrong to 
determine if they collectively consti-
tute a fraud, (citation omitted) 
A genuine issue of material fact exists 
as to [plaintiffs1] allegations of 
fraudulent conduct on the part of 
[Milne]f thereby precluding summary judgment. 
2) Plaintiffs1 claims against Milne include 
their claim for damages for falsely and fraudulently 
exercising her notarial duties which involved plaintiffs 
in litigation with Overland or placed them in such a 
relation with Overland which made it necessary to incur 
expense to protect their interest in the real property 
for which they may recover reasonable expenses of such 
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litigation, including attorney fees. South Sanpitch 
Co. v. Pack, 765 P.2d 1279 (Utah App. 1988); National 
Wrecking Co. v. Coleman, 487 N.E.2d 1164 (111.App. 1 
Dist. 1985). In South Sanpitch, the Utah Court of 
Appeals noted that "Nothing in this opinion should be 
taken to mean that damages in cases like these are 
limited to attorney fees. . . . " (p. 1282, fn. 5) 
Apellees1 summary judgment showing did not preclude, 
as a matter of law plaintiffs1 claim for attorney fees 
based on the "third-party tort rule" mentioned in South 
Sanpitch. Their motion was therefore insufficient as a 
matter of law. FMA Acceptance Co. v. Letherby Ins. Co. 
594 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1979). 
In part, the factual basis for plaintiffs1 claim 
against Milne is that her false notarization of the 
trust deed entitled the same to be recorded and such 
recording caused plaintiffs' title to be encumbered. 
Litigation expenses were incurred by plaintiffs as a 
result of having to vindicate their title. Implicit 
in appellees' argument (ante., 1 and 2) that nothing 
Milne did caused plaintiffs to lose their property and 
that Overland had the right to foreclose notwithstand-
ing Milne "notarized the trust deed without observing 
[plaintiffs] signing the documents.", is appellees' 
belief or contention that Grethe signing Dale's name 
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to the trust deed effectively encumbered his interest. 
(At fn. 5, of appellees1 motion [R. 580] appellees state 
"Dale Larson admits that his wife often signed docu-
ments for him. Dale Larson Deposition at 40.") The 
trust deed executed as this one was only operated to 
encumber Grethe's interest. Belnap v. Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., 627 P.2d 47 (Utah 1981); Texas American Bank/ 
Levelland v. Morgan, 733 P.2d 874 (N.M. 1978); Handy v. 
Shiells, 235 Cal.Rptr. 543 (Cal.App.lDist.1987). Grethe 
could not bind Dale to the trust deed. Carbine v. Meyer, 
126 Cal.2d 386, 272 P.2d 849 (1954), and there is no 
husband-wife exception to the statute of frauds. Williams 
v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986). Only a written 
power of attorney would suffice. Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149 (Utah 1983) . 
CONCLUSION 
Appellees' summary judgment motion was 
insufficient in law in its failure to show conclusively the 
absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Gaw v. State of 
Utah, 134 Utah Adv. Rep. 27 [1990]), and in its failure to 
preclude, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to 
plaintiffs, and was improperly granted. 
DATED January 14, 1991. 
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